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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Cet article étudie la dynamique des salaires et la mobilité des travailleurs dans les 
entreprises caractérisées par une structure hiérarchique des postes. L'objectif est d'établir 
une spécification empirique et de tester le modèle théorique de Gibbons et Waldman (1999) 
qui combine les notions de capital humain, d'avantage comparatif dans l'attribution des 
postes aux travailleurs et d'apprentissage, afin de mesurer l'importance de ces éléments 
dans la politique salariale des entreprises. Afin d'établir des conclusions générales sur les 
caractéristiques communes de la politique de rémunération d'un ensemble représentatif 
d'entreprises, l'estimation est appliquée aux données de l'enquête GSOEP (German Socio-
Economic Panel). Un autre avantage du GSOEP est de fournir le rang du travailleur dans 
son entreprise, information qui n'est généralement pas disponible dans les données 
d'enquête. Les résultats de l'estimation confirment la présence d'une répartition 
non aléatoire des travailleurs dans les différents niveaux de l'échelle des postes dans 
l'entreprise. Bien que l'habileté non observée constitue un facteur déterminant dans ce 
mécanisme de répartition et dans la politique salariale résultante, les résultats ne montrent 
pas d'évidence directe du rôle de l'apprentissage (de l'entreprise et du travailleur) de cette 
habileté non observée. Finalement, les effets de rang restent importants même après 
contrôle des caractéristiques mesurables et non mesurables du travailleur. 
 
Mots clés :  dynamique des salaires, mobilité dans l'entreprise, accumulation de capital 
humain, hétérogénéité non observée, apprentissage 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the dynamics of wages and workers' mobility within firms with a 
hierarchical structure of job levels. The theoretical model proposed by Gibbons and 
Waldman (1999), that combines the notions of human capital accumulation, job rank 
assignments based on comparative advantage and learning about workers' abilities, is 
implemented empirically to measure the importance of these elements in explaining the 
wage policy of firms. Survey data from the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) are 
used to draw conclusions on the common features characterizing the wage policy of firms 
from a large sample of firms. The GSOEP survey also provides information on the worker's 
rank within his firm which is usually not available in other surveys. The results are 
consistent with non-random selection of workers onto the rungs of a job ladder. There is no 
direct evidence of learning about workers' unobserved abilities but the analysis reveals that 
unmeasured ability is an important factor driving wage dynamics. Finally, job rank effects 
remain significant even after controlling for measured and unmeasured characteristics. 
 
Key words : wage dynamics, intra-firm mobility, human capital accumulation, unobserved 
heterogeneity, learning  
 
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of how wages are determined is central to the study of labour economics. The large
body of theoretical work that attempts to understand the factors governing wage outcomes oers
several possible explanations. Some of the models are based on the concepts of human capital
(Becker (1975), Hashimoto (1981)), learning (Harris and Holmstrom (1982)), and matching
(Jovanovic (1979)). Other models look at the role of incentives in compensation. Examples
include tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen (1981)) and eÆciency wage theory (Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984)).
The large variety of theoretical explanations has generated an extensive empirical literature
which has attempted to both utilize and distinguish between the competing theories. This
literature has focused on aspects of the question such as the return to interrm mobility on the
part of workers (Bartel and Borjas (1981), Simonet (1998), Topel and Ward (1992)), the covari-
ance structure of earnings across workers and rms (Parent(1995), Topel and Ward (1992)),
and inter-industry wage dierentials (Krueger and Summers (1988), Gibbons and Katz (1992)).
Thus far, little empirical work has been done on questions relating to how jobs are assigned
to workers and the resulting eects on the evolution of intrarm wage structures and mobility
within the rm.
This paper presents an empirical study of the common features characterizing the wage
policy of rms. More precisely, it analyzes what is driving the dynamics of wages and the
workers mobility within the rm. On one extreme, one might think about pay settings and job
assignments being regulated according to systematic bureaucratic rules. On the other extreme,
pay raises and promotions could be based on individual ability, with only high ability workers
benetting from it. Another possibility is that wage growth and mobility are driven by random
productivity shocks. To study wage dynamics I use the theoretical framework proposed by
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) in which, given a hierarchical structure of job levels within
rms, the determination of wages depends on how workers' abilities are evaluated within a job
rank, given that each job rank has dierent skill requirements. The model species a wage
equation integrating the elements of human capital accumulation, job assignment based on
comparative advantage and learning about the ability of workers to explain the dynamics of
wages and promotions inside rms. This paper analyzes the importance of these elements in
explaining the wage policy of rms.
The idea that the structure of wages within rms might be empirically important is not
new to labour economists. Previous empirical studies on the subject, however, have mainly
been restricted to providing analysis of specic questions on wage determination within the
rm without real attempt at relating them to the predictions of a formal theory. Other stud-
ies present stylized facts specic to one or a few rms and although very informative, the
conclusions remain restricted to the type of rm analyzed.
Doeringer and Piore (1971) are among the rst to present a detailed descriptive analysis of
the compensation schemes within a small sample of American rms, but attempts to formalise
their analysis are still in the early stages. One strand of the literature which examines these
issues, follows in the footsteps of Doeringer and Piore by using detailed observations on one or a
few rms. Chiappori, Salanie and Valentin(1999) take an econometric approach, using data on a
large French rm, to study questions related to \early starter-late beginner" eects (a prediction
of the learning theory) on the wages of individuals who remain within the institution. However
the data is specic to one rm, and they restrict the analysis to one particular aspect of the
dynamics of wages and promotions. Namely, they test the fact that for two workers in a rm
having the same wage in one period, the worker with the lowest wage the period before (dened
as the \late beginner") has a higher expected wage next period. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom
(1994 a,b) study several aspects of the internal wage structure of one medium sized U.S rm but
their analysis is a descriptive one. An alternate approach is taken by McCue (1996), who uses
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine the importance of promotions and intrarm
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mobility on wage growth. She estimates hazard models of intrarm mobility but does not
attempt to relate her ndings to the theoretical literature.
A number of stylized facts emerge from the empirical literature on the internal wage policy
and mobility within the rm since the last twenty years. First, the main nding on intrarm
mobility concerns serial correlation in promotion rates.
1
Rosenbaum (1984), Spilerman and
Petersen (1993), Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b), Podolny and Baron (1995) and
Chiappori and al. (1996). Holding tenure in the current job constant, promotion rates decrease
with tenure in the previous job. A related nding (although reported in only one rm) is
that demotions are really rare.
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Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b) Second, nominal wage
cuts are very rare but real wage cuts are much more common. Partly because nominal wage
increases are rather insensitive to ination, zero nominal increases are not rare.
3
Baker, Gibbs
and Holmstrom(1994 a,b) in the case of one rm and Card and Hyslop (1995) nd identical
conclusions using the CPS and PSID. A related nding is found in Peltzman (2000). Using
data from the BLS, it is found that output prices increase more than they decrease in response
to shocks in the cost of inputs. Increases in rm's labor costs would therefore induce real
wage decreases. Third, the dynamics of wages within the rm exhibit serial correlation in the
sense that a real wage increase (decrease) today is serially correlated with a real wage increase
(decrease) tomorow.
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Hause (1980), Lillard and Weiss (1979) and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom
(1994 a,b). Finally, studies that analyze the relationship between wages and intrarm mobility
nd that wage increases upon promotion are larger than without promotion.
5
Murphy (1985)
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b) and McCue (1996). However, wage increases upon
promotion are small compared to the dierence in average wages between two job levels. In
other words, signicant variations in wages remain within each level so that wages are not tied
to levels. In addition, wage increases forecast promotions in the sense that those who receive
larger wage increases get promoted more rapidly.
6
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b).
McCue (1996) nds that a high wage today is positively correlated to promotion tomorrow,
and, in the same spirit, Topel and Ward (1992) nd that prior wage growth aects mobility
even after controlling for the current wage.
Collectively, these observations pose a challenge to the existing theoretical literature, as
none of the existing theories can explain all of these stylized facts. In response to this challenge,
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) propose a synthesized model which combines on the job human
capital accumulation, job assignment based on comparative advantage and learning dynamics.
The predictions of their model are consistent with most of the stylized facts found in the
empirical literature. The objective of this paper is to implement empirically the Gibbons and
Waldman model and perform the estimation on a large sample of rms in order to test its ability
to explain the common features characterizing the wage policy of rms. In addition, estimating
the model on the sample of workers remaining with their rm and comparing the results to
those obtained from the sample that includes rm changers allows to distinguish between rm
specic eects and individual specic eects transferable across rms in the analysis of the
wage dynamics.
The estimation is performed using GMM techniques applied to the longitudinal data from
the German GSOEP over the period 1986-1996. This survey provides information on the work-
ers mobility between and within the rm and, more importantly for the analysis hereafter,
detailed information on the rank of the worker in his current occupation is available. The
German case is an interesting application of the model because the German labour market is
thought to dier signicantly from the U.S labour market (which provides many of the obser-
vations which motivate Gibbons and Waldman's research). Particularly, as shown by Simonet
(1998), interrm job mobility declines much earlier in a workers' career in Germany than in the
U.S. This suggests the possibility that intra-rm mobility may be more important in Germany
than in the United States. In addition, because of the strength of trade unions and their close
relationship with employer's associations, German rms have to deal with bureaucratic rules
governing the setting of wages and job assignments, which could aect the returns to intrarm
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mobility on the part of German workers. Therefore it is not clear a priori whether the factors
of comparative advantage and learning, which seem to explain the U.S experience, are more or
less important in Germany.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a description and a rst analysis of the
data. Section III sketches the theoretical model of Gibbons and Waldman and establishes the
framework of the econometric analysis and how this relates to the theory. Section IV presents
the results of the estimations, and Section V concludes the paper.
II. THE DATA
The data for the analysis come from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The GSOEP is
a representative longitudinal study of private households conducted every year in Germany
since 1984. This survey is unique for the analysis hereafter because it provides information
on movements between and within rms through a question about changes in the worker's
employment situation in the previous year. Most importantly, there is detailed information
on the rank occupied by the worker within his current occupation. To my knowledge, this
type of information is not available in any other surveys. These two pieces of information are
central to the study of wage and mobility dynamics within the rm. Another advantage is that
information is collected over a large sample of individuals and therefore, the analysis of wage
dynamics and intrarm mobility can be done for a large sample rms.
A. Data Selection
I considered information on the usual individual characteristics such as age, education, sex,
marital status and nationality. Information on bonuses received during the previous year and
on the duration of the employment contract (unlimited or limited length) are also available.
Wages are given on a monthly basis, corresponding to the month preceding the time of the
survey. For the rm's characteristics, the counterpart of using survey data is that precise
information on that part is limited. I used the type of industry, whether the rm belongs to
the public sector and rm size.
The panel spans the years 1985 to 1996 because information on mobility within the rm is
not available in 1984. Since it covers the German reunication, I have excluded data on the
former East German population to keep the pre and post unication samples comparable. I
have selected individuals aged between 20 and 65 who are working at the time of the survey
on a full-time basis. I have excluded self-employed workers and put a restriction on wages
excluding any observations below 500 DM per month.
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Since in Germany, the minimum wage
varies by industry, this bound should give a reasonable minimum in order to exclude outliers for
wages without loosing observations on low wage workers such as trainees. Finally, I considered
the sample of workers remaining with their rm over all the period, reporting either mobility
within the rm or no change in job situation. This leaves us with a sample consisting of
11159 observations (3487 workers). Appendix 1 describes the data selection in more details
and provides the sample means of the main variables used.
The objective of the next two subsections is to describe the data and to examine, in the
spirit of the Gibbons and Waldman model, the links between intrarm mobility, wage growth
and hierarchical levels of jobs for German workers. Two questions will be addressed: What
are the main determinants of intrarm mobility? By which channels does intrarm mobility
inuence the determination of wages from one hierarchical level to the next? That is, how are
individual skills eects and hierarchical level eects reected in the wage premium associated
to being in a higher rank on the job ladder? The analysis of these points is based on a logit
model of the probability of intrarm mobility and on inter-rank wage dierentials estimations.
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B. Intrarm Mobility and Individual and Firm Characteristics
In this subsection, I examine the eect of worker and rm characteristics on intrarm mobility.
The estimation method is based on a binomial logit model in which the benet from moving
within the rm is a function of observable characteristics. The alternative to the choice of
intrarm mobility is no changes in employment situation within the rm.
8
Appendix 2 presents
the frequencies of the dierent types of mobility.
Starting with a set of base characteristics, I look at the eect of adding particular variables
of interest on the probability of intrarm mobility. Among these variables are lagged bonuses
and lagged rate of wage growth.
9
The lag is such that bonuses and wage growth are considered
the year before mobility within the rm. If mobility within the rm is driven by the evolution
of the workers productive abilities, previous wage growth, where wages reect the evaluation
of abilities, should signicantly increase the chances of future mobility within the rm. In the
same vein, obtaining a bonus is a signal of improvement in the worker's productive abilities
and should have a positive impact on future mobility.
Among the base characteristics, I include dummies for nationality, sex and marital status.
Years of education are divided into three levels: primary (up to 10 years), high school (11 to
13 years) and college (14 years and more). Finally, I considered a quadratic function of tenure
dened as the number of years worked with the rm. Concerning the characteristics related
to the rm, I include a dummy for large rms (2000 employees or more), the duration of the
employment contract (unlimited or not), eight industry dummies
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I used the International
Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC). and a public sector dummy.
Results are shown in column 2 of Table I
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Given that the dependent variable has few
responses (y = 1) compared to non responses, using a probit model might produce dierent
results. I reestimated the model with the normal distribution. Results (available on request)
are similar in which they lead to the same conclusions in terms of marginal eect coeÆcient
and signicance of the coeÆcients. for the baseline model (column 3 shows the marginal eect
of each variables on the probability of intrarm mobility), and column 4 and 5 for the eect of
adding lagged bonuses and lagged wage growth. Column 6 shows the specication containing
all the variables and column 7 the marginal eect of these variables.
From column 2, one can see that college degrees increase signicantly the probability of
intrarm moves (relative to primary school). We can notice the negative eect of tenure within
the rm on intrarm mobility suggesting that workers mobility within the rm occurs mostly
at the beginning of the worker's career. In addition, we see that married individuals have a
signicantly lower probability of intrarm mobility. On the other hand, nationality and gender
have no signicant impact. For the characteristics related to the rm, we unsurprisingly see
that being in a large rm signicantly increases the likelihood of intrarm mobility and but
that the future mobility is independent of whether the rm is in the public sector or whether
the labour contract is of determinate length.
Introducing lagged bonus, as in column 4, has a particular impact on the variables. One can
rst see that the impact is signicantly negative: having received a bonus last year decreases
the chance of intrarm mobility today. One interpretation is that bonus would substitute rather
than complement intrarm mobility. On the other hand, bonus and promotion could be closely
related and not distinguishable, the negative impact of lagged bonus could then reect that last
year's mobility (and bonus received) is negatively correlated to the chance of mobility today.
Introducing lagged wage growth in column 5 also has a noticeable impact on the other
variables. First, it increases signicantly the probability of intrarm mobility next period.
The coeÆcient is particularly large compared to the others. In addition, college education is
no longer signicant. The results for all the other variables remain unchanged compared to
column 2 so that the main eect of controlling for lagged wage growth is on college education.
Lagged wage growth may be a more accurate measure of individual skills than the level of
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education, providing a better signal of ability for mobility decisions. Finally, the results of
column 6 where both the lagged bonus and the wage growth are added are similar to those of
column 5. Controlling for the lagged bonus does not alter the relatively strong impact of lagged
wage growth on intrarm mobility.
Based on the idea that part of wage growth reects the worker's productive abilities, the
signicant impact of lagged wage growth on intrarm mobility provides a rst piece of evidence
supporting the role of ability as driving the worker's mobility within the rm. In order to
raÆne the analysis of the interactions between intrarm mobility and the dynamics of wages
within the rm, the next section investigates the relation between the wages and the dierent
ranks that the worker can reach within his or her job. In particular, I am interested in the
way individual characteristics compared to job related characteristics are reected in wages. To
analyze this point, I use the information on the dierent ranks of each occupation to establish
inter-rank wage dierentials.
C. Inter-Rank Wage Dierentials
This section analyzes the contribution of job ranks relative to individual characteristics on
wages by estimating the impact of the worker's skills on inter-rank wage dierentials. In a
second step, I present preliminary evidence on the importance of unobserved ability in the
determination of wages and analyze whether comparative advantage based on measured ability
is important.
An interesting feature of the GSOEP survey that is rarely found in other surveys is that it
provides information on the level or rank occupied by the worker in his current job. Occupations
are grouped in ve categories: Blue-collar, white-collar, civil servant, trainee and self-employed.
I considered the rst three given that self-employment is not relevant for the analysis and that
the trainee category is not in itself an occupation.
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Individuals reporting trainees who were
also reported in one of the other occupations have been retained. Each occupation is divided in
several levels according to the qualication and responsibility requirements. Since the number
of ranks is not the same for all the jobs, I have dened 4 ranks based on a more general
qualication criterion:
1. unskilled or semi-skilled work
2. skilled work
3. highly skilled work
4. executive work
Appendix 3 reports the raw wage dierentials (relative to the rst rank) and average in-
dividual characteristics by rank. The dierentials increase along the ladder but in dierent
proportion depending on the type of occupation with white-collared workers showing the high-
est dierentials in each rank. Although one might expect that these rank wage premium reect
the increasing responsibilities and tasks complexity related to the higher ranks, one can observe
a positive correlation with measures of individual ability such as education. The link with the
other characteristics is however less clear. A global measure of the workers's individual char-
acteristics would be more convenient for the analysis of the interaction between the worker's
abilities and job rank and its eect on wage outcomes.
In order to summarize individual characteristics into one variable characterizing the worker's
skills, I considered a OLS regression of the wage level on education, marital status, sex, nation-
ality, experience and squared experience, industry and occupation type over the entire original
sample of workers (before the sample selection has been done). I used the estimated coeÆ-
cients associated with education, experience, marital status, gender and nationality to compute
5
the estimated wage based on these characteristics and normalized it to zero to obtain a skill
index.
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This index, reported in the last column of Appendix 3, corresponds to the predicted
wage conditional on measured individual characteristics.
Column 1 of Table II presents the results of a regression of wages on rank dummies with
controls for occupations and industries. One can notice that those coeÆcients are signicant
and are lower than the raw wage dierentials of the Appendix 4 Table ( 0.49, 1.67 and 2.46 in
the aggregate denition of ranks) when no controls have been considered. Column 2 of Table II
considers the impact of adding the skill variable on rank eects. It shows that the skill variable
is highly signicant and controlling for skills reduces the impact of the rank dummies. However,
the wage dierentials are still signicant, increasing by rank from 0.12 for rank 2 to 0.68 for
rank 3 and 1.20 for rank 4 (all with respect to rank 1).
The next column of Table II presents the results of a xed-eect estimation in order to
assess the presence of unmeasured (by the econometrician) individual ability. Assuming that
it is time invariant and equally valued in the dierent ranks, it is possible to eliminate (or
control for) this term by using rst dierence method. If unmeasured ability does not matter
in the determination of wages, the xed-eect estimation results should be similar to the OLS
results. One can see from Column 3 that the xed-eect coeÆcients on ranks have dropped
signicantly, although still signicant. This suggests that part of the rank wage premium is
explained by unmeasured skills and part of it still reects rank eects.
The notion that workers have a comparative advantage in some job ranks is equivalent
to say that along the successive rungs of the job ladder, skills are dierently rewarded and
that workers sort themselves into a given rank. Column 4 of Table II considers the possibility
that comparative advantage and self-selection operate on measured skills. To take this into
account, I included to the baseline regression of column 1, interactions of the skill index and
the worker's job rank. One can see that the coeÆcients on the interactions are signicant. A
test of equality of these coeÆcients leads to the rejection of the null (
2
(3) of 103.43) which
conrms the existence of distinct valuations of measured skills in each rank.
The analysis of Section II has shown that past wage growth has a noticeable impact on
the likelihood of mobility within the rm. The wage premium associated with the dierent
ranks that the worker can attain in his career do not entirely reect the dierentials in task
and responsibility requirements (rank eects) but also the dierentials in measured individual
skills. Moreover, there is evidence that each job level is dierently sensitive to measured skills
so that workers may self-select into the dierent levels having a comparative advantage in one
level based on their measured skills. Finally, the results on the rst dierence estimation lead
us to suspect that unmeasured ability may also matter in the explanation of the inter-rank
wage dierentials and thus, in the wage dynamics. All together these results suggest that the
worker's ability seem to be a good candidate in the explanation of what is driving the wage
dynamics and mobility within the rm. The next section present a the Gibbons and Waldman
model in which ability drives job level assignments and wage dynamics.
III. MODEL AND ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
This section summarizes the Gibbons and Waldman model of intrarm mobility and wage
determination and highlights the model's main predictions. The aim of the model is to char-
acterize the relationship between a worker's career path and the evolution of his wage within
the rm. It integrates wage determination and job assignments in a dynamic context, where
the wage policy of the rm is based on comparative advantages and learning. In other words,
it endogenizes workers' choices of job rank as workers are assigned to the job rank that better
reward their productive abilities. In addition, it endogenizes mobility between job ranks be-
cause, if the productive abilities of the workers are not perfectly observed, both the rm and
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the worker learn about it and changes in expected ability lead the worker to move to another
rank of the job ladder.
More precisely, rms are modeled as consisting of various potential job assignments and,
because jobs are dierently sensitive to ability, comparative advantage determines the assign-
ment rule on the basis of output maximization. The dynamics is introduced in the model by
considering that output grows with the workers' accumulation of human capital or productive
abilities each period. In addition, output grows at a dierent speed depending on the level of
innate ability of the worker. All the workers end up reaching the upper level of the job ladder
but some get there faster than others. When innate ability is not perfectly observed, learning
takes place and wages and mobility within the rm are driven by the evolution of expected
ability.
A. Summary of the Model
The model consists of identical rms operating in a competitive environment and producing
output using labour as the only input. All rms consist of a three-level job ladder where jobs
are indexed by j = 1; 2 or 3. Jobs are dened in advance, independent of the people who ll
them. Both rms and workers are risk-neutral and have a discount rate of zero.
A worker's career lasts for T periods. Worker i has innate ability, denoted by 
i
, which can
be either high (
H
) or low (
L
). The worker has also eective ability, 
it
, dened as the prod-
uct of his innate ability and some function f of his labor-market experience x
it
prior to period t:

it
= 
i
f(x
it
) with f
0
> 0 and f
00
 0 (1)
The production technology is such that if worker i is assigned to job j in period t then he
produces output y
ijt
where:
y
ijt
= d
j
+ c
j
(
it
+ "
ijt
) (2)
where d
j
is the value of job j independent of the worker's characteristics and c
j
measures the
sensitivity of job j to eective ability. The constants c
j
and d
j
are known to all labor-market
participants and it is assumed that c
3
> c
2
> c
1
and d
3
< d
2
< d
1
. "
ijt
is a noisy term
drawn independently from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 
2
. Wages are
determined by spot-market contracting. More precisely, at the beginning of each period, all
rms simultaneously oer each worker a wage for that period and each worker chooses the rm
that oers the highest wage. Hence, competition among rms yields wages equal to expected
output.
w
ijt
= Ey
ijt
= d
j
+ c
j

it
= d
j
+ c
j

i
f(x
it
) (3)
EÆcient task assignment is obtained in the sense that a worker is assigned to the job that
maximizes his expected output.
In the case of perfect information, 
i
, is common knowledge at the beginning of the worker's
career and therefore 
it
is always known. In this case, job assignments and wages in equilibrium
are given according to the following rule:
1. If 
it
< 
0
then worker i is assigned to job 1 in period t and earns w
it
= d
1
+ c
1

it
.
2. If 
0
< 
it
< 
00
then worker i is assigned to job 2 in period t and earns w
it
= d
2
+ c
2

it
.
3. If 
it
> 
00
then worker i is assigned to job 3 in period t and earns w
it
= d
3
+ c
3

it
.
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where 
0
(
00
) denotes the eective ability level at which a worker is equally productive at jobs
1 and 2 (2 and 3). In equilibrium, the workers climb the successive rungs of the job ladder as
they gain experience.
The model under perfect information can explain most of the stylized facts of the empirical
literature. Particularly, the model exhibits the absence of demotions, serial correlation in wage
increases and in promotion rates, and the fact that wage increases predict promotions and
explain only a fraction of the dierence in average wages across levels.
More precisely, there are no demotions in equilibrium because eective ability increases
monotonically. Serial correlation in wage increases occurs because eective ability grows dif-
ferently for each worker due to their dierent levels of innate ability. That is, for a given level
of experience, high ability workers will get higher wage increases than low ability workers and
the same ordering will hold for wage increases at all experience levels.
The model is able to explain serial correlation in promotion rates for the same reasons. If

0
and 
00
  
0
are both suÆciently large then high ability workers are promoted to job 2 more
quickly and spend less time on job 2 before being promoted to job 3. Moreover, since those who
receive larger wage increases are also those who are promoted to job 2 earlier in their careers,
wage increases predict promotions.
Finally, wage increases upon promotion explain a fraction of the dierence between average
wages across levels because, on average, part of the workers at higher levels are more experienced
and the dierence between average wages at dierent levels is given by the average experience
or eective ability accumulated. This dierence is bigger than the average wage increase at
promotion which captures the value of only one year of experience.
In the case of perfect information, however, the explanation for the large wage increases upon
promotion is not fully satisfactory. The model predicts average wage increases at promotion
are higher than if the worker remains in his current job because increases in eective ability are
valued in part at the rate of the current job ( c
j
) and in part at the higher rate of the next job
( c
j
) if promotion occurred. For the same reason, however, the model predicts that the average
wage increases after promotion which, according to the empirical ndings, should not be the
case. Moreover, the monotonicity of the eective ability accumulation function precludes the
possibility of real wage decreases.
When information on innate ability is imperfect (but symmetric), workers and rms start
with the initial belief p
0
that a given worker is of innate ability 
H
and with 1  p
0
that he is

L
. Learning takes place at the end of each period when the realization of a worker's output
for that period is revealed. Learning occurs gradually because of the productivity shock "
ijt
,
which introduces noise into the output produced.
To be precise, each period a worker's output provides a noisy signal, z
it
, about his eective
ability where:
z
it
= (y
ijt
  d
j
)=c
j
= 
it
+ "
ijt
Note that z
it
is independent of job assignment so that learning takes place identically across
jobs. The agents' expectations of the innate ability of worker i with x years of prior labor-
market experience at period t will therefore be conditioned on the history of signals extracted
from the observed outputs. Formally, this expectation is dened as:

e
it
= E(
i
jz
it x
; :::; z
it 1
)
Because output is a linear function of eective ability, expected output at the beginning of
period t, and therefore wages, will be based on expected eective ability (conditional on the
information set of t  1). Task assignment in each period is then based on the maximization of
current expected output.
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The addition of imperfect information and learning does not change the ability of the model
to explain the stylized facts discussed previously and allows the model to explain the possibility
of real wage decreases. The main argument is based on the fact that this time, wages depend
on expected innate ability whose evolution is now driven by the evolution of agents' beliefs.
Because agents have rational expectations, expected innate ability follows a martingale process:

e
it
= 
e
it 1
+ u
it
(4)
This means that the best prediction of future expected innate ability is current expected ability.
In other words, any changes in current beliefs should be caused by the arrival of new information
contained in the observed current output and could not be predicted from previous realized
outputs.
The main dierence with the perfect information case is that now, a worker's expected
innate ability can fall from one period to the next if u
it
is negative, and if the decrease is
suÆciently large, it will dominate the increase due to human capital accumulation and next
period wage will fall. For the same reason, there will be a positive frequency of demotions.
Serial correlation in wage increases continues to hold under the restriction of no demo-
tions.
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However, serial correlation in promotion rates is not a clear prediction of the model
with learning. No matter how informative a worker's history of past output is, an extreme
value of the next period output can radically change the beliefs for that period. See Gibbons
and Waldman for a discussion on this point. The reasoning is the same as in the perfect infor-
mation case. Worker who experience large wage increases between t and t + 1 are worker for
whom expected innate ability at t+1 has increased. This means that on average, the worker's
expected eective ability will grow faster in the future. Large wage increases are thus positively
correlated to large wage increases in the future.
The model gives predictions consistent with the fact that wage increases predict promotion.
A large wage increase indicates an increase in expected innate ability which means that on
average eective ability will grow more quickly in the future so that the worker will need less
time to reach the target level of expected eective ability needed for promotion.
Finally, the size of the average wage increase on promotion is larger than the average wage
increases before and, this time, after promotion. The worker promoted at the end of the period
had a larger increase in expected eective ability than the worker not promoted. The wage
increase will then be higher for this reason and also because the increase in expected ability will
be valued at a bigger rate (c
j+1
> c
j
). After the promotion, the expected change in expected
innate ability is zero so the wage increase is smaller on average than the wage increase at
promotion. Wage increase at promotion explain a fraction of the dierence in average wages
across levels by the same argument on age and length of human capital accumulation as in the
perfect information case.
In summary, the model under perfect information based on comparative advantage in the
assignment of workers to job levels can explain the observed serial correlation in wage increases
and promotion rates, the fact that wage increases predict promotions but that they explain only
a fraction of the dierence in average wages across levels. The introduction of learning allows the
possibility of real wage decreases and that average wage increases are higher upon promotion
than before and after promotion. Under particular hypothesis on 
0
and 
00
  
0
, dening
intervals of eective ability in each job levels, the model leads to the prediction on absence
of demotions. Thus, the model can explain the stylized facts highlighted in the literature on
wages and intrarm mobility.
The results of Section II, which suggest rst the presence of an unmeasured individual
ability term and second, that there is evidence of workers' self-selection due to comparative
advantage on measured ability, are consistent with the Gibbons and Waldman model. Given
that unmeasured (or unobserved) ability is correlated with measured ability, evidence on the fact
that workers also have a comparative advantage on unmeasured ability is expected to be found.
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To test more rigorously whether the model is supported by the data, a more sophisticated
method than the rst dierence method has to be used. In the next Section, I present the
econometric specication of the model and the estimation method which takes into account the
comparative advantage and the learning principles based on innate ability.
B. Econometric Specication
Empirical evidence on inter-industry wage dierentials has created controversy on the estima-
tion method used to explain them. Gibbons and Katz (1992) have presented a theoretical
model which emphasizes the importance of both endogenous mobility driven by the dynamic
evolution of an unmeasured ability term and endogenous choice of industry or self selection of
workers into industries due to the dierent sensitivity of industries' technologies with respect
to this ability term. The model of Gibbons and Waldman formalizes these ideas in the context
of the wage policy of the rm with endogenous choice of job levels and endogenous mobility
between these job levels. The purpose of this Section is to present an econometric specication
of the dynamic of wages implied by the model of Gibbons and Waldman where the endogeneity
problems induced by the comparative advantage and the learning hypotheses can be accounted
for and the relative importance of their eects on the dynamics of wages can be estimated.
The specication accounts for the general case of comparative advantage and learning (the
model under imperfect information). That is, the process for wages, equation (3) is written
using the expectation of workers' ability, 
e
it
.
In order to control for measurable individual characteristics, I included the skill variable
dened previously. Employing dummies, D
ijt
, indicating the rank j of individual i at time t,
the equation to be estimated can be written as:
w
ijt
=
J
X
j=1
D
ijt
d
j
+
J
X
j=1
D
ijt
X
it

j
+
J
X
j=1
D
ijt
c
j

e
it
f(x
it
) + 
it
(5)
where 
it
is a measurement error independent of rank assignment, and X
it
corresponds to the
skill variable. Comparative advantage is characterized by the fact that the coeÆcients 
j
and
c
j
vary by rank and learning is represented by the conditional expectation 
e
it
.
Estimating equation (5) with OLS would give inconsistent estimates. The comparative ad-
vantage hypothesis implies that rank assignment is endogenous, so 
e
it
is correlated with the
rank dummies. In addition, this term cannot be eliminated by rst-dierencing (5) because
it is interacted with the D
ijt
terms. Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) analyze models in
which a xed eect is interacted with year dummies and show that consistent estimates can
be obtained by quasi-dierencing the equation of interest and using appropriate instrumental-
variable techniques. Lemieux (1998) applies this method to a model in which the return to
a time-invariant unobserved characteristic is dierent in the union and the non-union sector.
Gibbons, Katz and Lemieux (1997) also use this method to analyze wage dierentials by in-
dustry and occupation in the presence of unmeasured and unobserved ability interacted with
industry and occupation dummies. I apply this method to estimate the wage equation (5).
C. Estimation Method
The rst step is to eliminate 
e
it
by quasi-dierencing equation (5) in the following manner:
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e
it
=
w
ijt
 
P
J
j
D
ijt
d
j
 
P
J
j
D
ijt
X
it

j
  
it
P
J
j
D
ijt
c
j
f(x
it
)
(6)
The martingale property of beliefs in innate ability which links 
e
it
and 
e
it 1
implies that we
can substitutes a lagged version of this equation into (5). The nal equation is therefore given
by:
w
ijt
=
J
X
j=1
D
ijt
d
j
+
J
X
j=1
D
ijt
X
it

j
+
P
J
j
D
ijt
c
j
f(x
it
)
P
J
j
D
ijt 1
c
j
f(x
it 1
)
w
ijt 1
 
P
J
j
D
ijt
c
j
f(x
it
)
P
J
j
D
ijt 1
c
j
f(x
it 1
)
[
J
X
j=1
D
ijt 1
d
j
+
J
X
j=1
D
ijt 1
X
it 1

j
] + e
it
(7)
where e
it
= 
it
+
J
X
j=1
D
ijt
u
it
 
P
J
j
D
ijt
c
j
f(x
it
)
P
J
j
D
ijt 1
c
j
f(x
it 1
)

it 1
(8)
This equation cannot be estimated using non-linear least square because w
ijt 1
is correlated
with 
it 1
. Moreover, because of the presence of learning, the new information on innate
ability at time t, u
it
, is correlated with D
ijt
since beliefs on ability inuences the current
rank aÆliation. These problems can be solved by choosing appropriate instruments for w
ijt 1
and D
ijt
, and consistent estimates will be obtained. Calling Z
i
the set of instruments, these
variables have to satisfy the following condition:
E(e
it
Z
i
) = 0 (9)
The objective is then to minimize the following quadratic form:
min

e()
0
Z(Z
0

Z)
 1
Z
0
e() (10)
where Z
0

Z is the covariance matrix of the vector of moments Z
0
e(), 
 is the covariance
matrix of the error term e
it
and  is the vector of parameters. Under homoscedasticity and
serial independence of the error terms, 
 = I (up to a constant 
2
which disappears in the
minimization of (10)), so that the weighting matrix is equal to Z
0
Z and the method gives
a consistent Non-Linear Instrumental Variables estimator. An eÆcient estimator is obtained
by estimating 
. I will consider the two types of estimation using the SAS Non Linear IV
procedure.
Finally, the unmeasured ability term 
it
in the error term of equation (5) has to be nor-
malized to zero over the observations in order to identify all the parameters.
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A proof of the
necessity of this constraint is given in Lemieux (1998). This is done by adding the following
equation to the optimization of (10):
(1=TN)
X
i
X
t

it
= 0 (11)
where N is the number of individuals, T is the number of periods for each individual and 
it
satises equation (6).
Instruments are chosen using the identication assumption for estimation of panel data
equations that imposes strict exogeneity of right-hand side variables or more formally:
E(
it
=X
i1
:::X
iT
; D
ij1
:::D
ijT
; 
i
) = 0 (12)
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The estimation has rst been done under the assumption of perfect information on the
ability term 
i
, focusing on the impact of comparative advantage and self-selection of workers
into the dierent ranks with innate ability known to all market participants. In this case, the
innovation driving the martingale process for beliefs disappears from the error term of equation
(7) and the instruments are chosen to correct the correlation of lagged wage with the error term

it 1
, resulting from the quasi-dierencing method.
Condition (12) provides a set of potential instruments since it states that conditional on
observed innate ability, individual characteristics and rank assignments each period are in-
dependent of the error term in the wage equation (5). In addition, since according to the
production technology (equation (2)), new information contained in the observation of current
output has the same impact across ranks, conditional on innate ability and other measurable
characteristics, the current choice of job level is random. In the spirit of Lemieux's estimation
of comparative advantage mentioned before, I consider as instruments for the lagged wage the
history of job level or rank dummy variables. In particular, interaction terms between D
ijt 1
and D
ijt
which give information on the career path of the worker between t  1 and t, should
help predict w
ijt 1
. Indeed, according to the Gibbons and Waldman model, the choice of a
job level is inuenced by innate ability and should therefore be correlated to the wage but
uncorrelated to the error term 
it
because of condition (12).
In the imperfect information case, the presence of learning introduces another correlation
problem. Now that innate ability evolves over time as beliefs change, the current choice of
job rank D
ijt
is correlated to the changes in beliefs between t and t   1 (reected in the
martingale innovation u
it
which appears in the error term e
it
). Therefore, D
ijt
will have to be
instrumented. The choice of instruments will be facilitated thanks to the martingale process for
innate ability which implies that changes in beliefs today are uncorrelated to changes in beliefs
the period before. Therefore, it is possible to use the choice of job level in the previous periods,
D
ijt 2
and D
ijt 1
, because they are correlated to the changes in expected ability in period
t  2 and t  1 (helping predict D
ijt
) but are uncorrelated to the current changes u
it
and thus,
uncorrelated to the error term e
it
in the quasi-dierencing equation. As before, interaction
between D
ijt 2
and D
ijt 1
will also be considered. This set of variables will also provide valid
instruments for w
ijt 1
for the same reasons as in the case of perfect information.
The estimation results will be presented in two parts. First, equation (7) is estimated under
the assumption of perfect information to emphasize the impact of comparative advantage on

i
(observed by the market but unmeasured by the econometrician). Second, the estimation is
performed for the model with comparative advantage and learning about 
i
.
Note that in both cases the element
f(x
it
)
f(x
it 1
)
, representing the ratio of accumulated expe-
rience in t with regard to t   1, has to be specied. According to the Mincer wage equation,
wages when studied in log, are specied by a polynomial function of experience. Since wages
here are in level, it should be reasonable to assume an exponential function of this same poly-
nomial in experience. This leads to the following functional form for the ratio g(x
it
) =
f(x
it
)
f(x
it 1
)
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Assuming f(x
it
) = e

0
+
1
x
it
 
2
x
2
it
then g(x
it
) = e

1
+
2
 2
2
x
it
. :
g(x
it
) = b
0
e
 b
1
x
it
(13)
Going back to the Gibbons and Waldman model, the estimation of a ratio higher than
unity will conrm that the function f of human capital accumulation is non constant and
monotonically increasing with experience. In other words, it will show evidence of unmeasured
(unobserved in the learning case) heterogeneity in the accumulation of human capital and
therefore in wage increases and mobility. According to the model, the evolution of the worker's
productive ability over time (dened as the product of ability 
i
and the experience funtion
f) is driven by an unmeasured ability term and since it enters linearly in the wage function,
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the wage dynamics will be driven by this 
i
term. As seen in Section II, this implies serial
correlation in wage increases and in promotion rates as the rm observes (or expects) that
some individuals perform better than others, it assigns them to higher ranks. They receive
higher wage increases not only as a result of mobility between ranks but also within a rank as
they vary across workers of dierent type 
i
17
With an estimated b
1
signicant, the ratio will
vary with experience which implies that accumulation of human capital would not only vary
across workers but also over time..
IV. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
The analysis of the results is presented in four parts. The rst part focuses on the estimation of
the wage dynamics for workers remaining inside their rm (Table III). The second part performs
the same estimations but this time with the sample including workers changing rms to study
the possible dierences in the impact of measured and unmeasured (unobserved) ability on the
wage dynamics (Table IV). The third part concentrates on the estimation of the human capital
accumulation ratio (Table V). The last part considers the estimation with non homoscedastic
errors and the problem of classication errors in the rank variables (Table VI).
A. Wage Dynamics Within Firms
Results, shown in the rst part of Table III, conrm the importance of non random selection
of workers based on unmeasured ability. The coeÆcients c
j
which evaluate the impact of
unmeasured ability in each rank j are signicant. Starting at 1 (normalization) for rank L,
they range from 1.043 for the middle rank M, to 1.475 for the upper rank U and 1.600 for the
executive rank E. They are signicantly dierent from one another according to the joint test
(
2
(3) of 15.00) and, except for rank M, are also signicantly dierent from the lower rank L
(
2
(1) of 10.10 for U and 4.69 for E). These results suggest distinct and increasing returns to
unmeasured ability by hierarchical level.
The inter-rank wage dierentials d
j
have dropped by about 80% compared to the OLS results
in column (4) of Table II when only comparative advantage on measured skills is considered.
The coeÆcients related to measured skills by rank (the 
j
) are still signicantly dierent from
one another (
2
(3) of 6.12 for the joint test) implying that comparative advantage on measured
ability is still important but compared to column (4) of Table II, its impact is smaller. One
can also notice that their impact is now decreasing with ranks, ranging from 0.735 in rank
L to being not signicantly dierent from 0 in the highest rank E. In summary, non random
selection or comparative advantage of workers based on unmeasured ability seems to capture an
important part of the variation in the dynamics of wages within the rm and the part related
to measured ability becomes less and less important as workers go up the ladder. Although
signicantly reduced, the rank eects are still signicant.
The second part of Table III reports the results of the model when learning about unobserved
ability is considered. One can see that only the rank eect for the middle rank M is signicant.
Moreover, except for rank M and c
M
, the slopes associated with unobserved ability are not
dierent from one another and not dierent from the lower rank slope. The slopes associated
with measured ability remain signicant at all rank. Generally, the standard errors of the
coeÆcients are larger than in the case with no learning. Results are more imprecise and hard
to interpret. In fact, except for the middle rank M, the c
j
which measure the impact of
unmeasured ability (unobserved in this case) in each rank are no longer increasing in ranks.
From these results, it is rather diÆcult to draw conclusions about the eects of learning on the
wage dynamics. The overall imprecision of the results might come from the use of second and
third lags of the variables for the instruments which leads to a substantial loss of observations.
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In both estimations the human capital accumulation ratio has been estimated as a constant
term b
0
, and one can see that in the comparative advantage case it is signicantly dierent
from one. Its estimated value of 1.024 gives, in log, a 2.37 % growth rate for the function f
of human capital accumulation. In other words, controlling for all other measurable individual
characteristics, one more year of experience within the rm is associated with a 2.37 % wage
increase for the average worker. In the specication with learning, the ratio is not signicantly
dierent from one, implying that the function f is constant or that there is no evidence of
unobserved heterogeneity in the workers' human capital accumulation.
Finally, note that in both estimations the over-identication test
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The statistic of the test
uses the optimized value of the objective function times the number of observations. The
distribution is 
2
(l p) where p is the number of parameters and l is the number of instruments.
shows that the instruments used are valid since the null cannot be rejected.
Summarizing the overall results, one can say that the dynamics of wages and workers'
mobility within the rm are characterized by the importance of non random selection of workers
into job ranks and by the presence of unmeasured heterogeneity in human capital accumulation
leading to the result that wage increases are serially correlated. The inconclusive results on
the presence of learning as the factor driving workers' mobility across job ranks, suggests
that German workers are not mobile within the rm. Once they enter the rm, they get to
the job rank that best suit their productive abilities and remain in that job thereafter. A
possible explanation for that is the importance of the apprenticeship system in Germany. In
this system, individuals receive training within a rm for a certain period of time while still
completing school. During that period, both the rm and the worker obtain information on the
productivity of the employer-employee match and both can use it in their future employment
decisions. Since the sample studied considers individuals just after entering the labor force on
a permanent basis, those working while still completing school have not been considered.
The results on serial correlation in wage increases (controlling for measurable individual
characteristics) is in contrast with the literature mentioned earlier which nds an absence of
serial correlation when estimating the covariance structure of wages and wage residuals (Abowd
and Card (1989) and Topel and Ward (1992). However, it is in accordance with studies that
analyzed the question with particular samples of workers (Hause (1980) who uses a sample
of white-collar Swedish males and Lillard and Weiss (1979) who study a sample of American
scientists).
In the analysis so far, I considered the sample of workers remaining with their rms and
the heterogeneity captured in the results could be worker-rm specic rather than individual
specic. To examine whether the eects of heterogeneity in human capital accumulation, com-
parative advantage and learning driving the wage dynamics are more individual or worker-rm
specic, I estimate, in the next Section, the model over a sample that includes rm changers.
B. Wage Dynamics Within and Between Firms
The results from performing the estimations on the sample of workers moving within and
between rms are presented in Table IV. They are similar to those obtained with the sample of
rm stayers concerning the presence of non random selection and comparative advantage. One
can notice an increasing eect of unmeasured ability and a decreasing eect of measured skills
with ranks. Rank eects are also still signicant. Also, the second part of the Table shows
that, as before, there is no clear evidence of learning.
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Because learning does not seem to be
supported by the data, the analysis thereafter focuses on the specication with comparative
advantage only.
In the comparative advantage case, the dierences between the estimations over the two
samples lies in the magnitude of the slope coeÆcients related to unmeasured ability and mea-
sured skills for the dierent ranks. The slope associated with unmeasured ability at the highest
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executive rank E and the ones related to measured skills at the lower ranks L, M and U are
now higher. More precisely, for the slope coeÆcients on unmeasured ability, the eect c
E
is
twice as high as the one at the lowest rank L which is higher than in the previous results ( c
E
is
2.02 compared to 1.6 in Table III). On the other hand, the coeÆcients associated with middle
and upper ranks c
M
and c
U
are similar to those of Table III. The slope coeÆcient on measured
skills is not signicant at the highest rank E, as in the previous case, but the coeÆcients 
L
; 
M
and 
U
are much higher now than in Table III.
These results suggest that the impact of unmeasured ability on the wage dynamics seems
to be more individual specic at the executive rank. At the lower ranks, the inclusion of
rm changers did not change the impact of unmeasured ability as much. On the other hand,
the impact of measured skills is higher at these ranks when observations on workers' mobility
between rms are included in the sample. It can be concluded from these results that the
eect of unmeasured ability at the lower, middle and upper ranks does not seem to result from
an individual specic ability eect that would be transferable across rms but results from a
worker-rm specic match quality eect.
In summary, the wage policy of rms is characterized by the importance of non random
selection of workers into job ranks and the existence of unmeasured heterogeneity in wage in-
creases. This result is surprising given that the German labor market is regulated by unions and
employers' associations which would suggest that pay settings are more related to bureaucratic
rules. On the other hand, I nd evidence that the rank eects d
j
are still signicant even after
controlling for measured and unmeasured characteristics. Note that these coeÆcients always
increase with ranks which is not in accordance with the Gibbons and Waldman model's as-
sumption that they should be decreasing with ranks. In the model, wages are set according to
a piece-rate pay system based on expected output. Both the slopes and intercepts are param-
eters that are given to the rm but depend on the equilibrium allocation of workers' skills to
job ranks. Workers with low level of skills or performance are assigned to (and also choose) low
job ranks, where the wage puts the least weight on skills, i.e. with a high intercept and a at
slope. The highly skilled worker ends up in a high job rank with a wage mostly based on skills
(with a low intercept and a high slope). This negative correlation between the intercept and
the slope is not as clear when wages are not only function of skills but also depend on the rm's
bureaucratic rules. The results here suggest that the intercepts or rank eects reect more ad-
ministrative settings specic to the job such as task complexity and responsibility requirements
which increase with rank independently of the worker's skill level.
C. Human Capital Accumulation
The results so far come from the estimation of the wage equation with a constant ratio of human
capital accumulation. Workers accumulate years of experience within the rm at dierent rates
but no matter what period of time in the worker's career, one additional year of experience has
the same impact. One might think however that the impact is stronger at the beginning than at
the end of the worker's career. I reestimated the model considering the more general functional
form given in (13). Results are shown in Table V for the case with comparative advantage but
no learning
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Results with learning, available on request, did not lead to a signicant estimation
of the coeÆcients b
0
and b
1
.. The ratio has been estimated as a function of the number of years
of tenure with the rm. The estimation using the number of years of potential experience
did not lead to the convergence of the objective function in the optimization process. Also,
convergence could not be reached for no other functional form for the ratio than the one shown
in table V, where the coeÆcient b
0
is constrained to be equal to one. Finally, the two parts of
the Table relate to the estimations on the two dierent samples used previously.
For the results on the presence of non random selection of workers into job ranks, one can
see that the conclusions are the same as before. The coeÆcients on measured and unmeasured
ability and the rank eects are similar to those from the rst part of Tables III and IV with
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comparative advantage only and a constant ratio. For the results on the estimation of the
ratio, the impact of tenure (coeÆent b
1
) is signicant but very small and, contrary to what
was expected, it is positive.
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According to the human capital theory, one additional year of
experience should have a decreasing impact with increasing years of experience with the rm.
The ratio is in fact very close to one for the rst year of tenure (ratio of 1.001) and still remains
close to it after 10 years (ratio of 1.01) leading to estimated wage increases of 0.1 % and 1 %
respectively. Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that the ratio does not seem to vary with
the worker's tenure in the rm.
D. Discussion of the Results
Despite the preceding evidence on non random selection of workers onto the hierarchical levels
of the rm's job ladder and on unmeasured ability driving the dynamics of wages, there are
several issues to keep in mind in anlysing the results. Among those is the assumption of
homoscedasticity of the error term. Since this might be a strong hypothesis, I reestimated the
equation, using an estimate of 
 in a second step, where the rst step estimates by NLIV with

 = I , using the residuals from the estimation in the rst step to estimate 
 (Hansen (1982)).
The results of this estimation are presented in the rst part of Table VI for the comparative
advantage case.
Generally, correcting for possible heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation of the error term
lead to more imprecise estimates. The results are quite dierent from those in Table III in terms
of the magnitude and also standard errors of the coeÆcients. Moreover, the value of the statistic
of the overidentication test is now quite high (58.99) leading to reject the hypothesis of valid
instruments.
The fact that the statistic of the test (based on the optimized value of the objective function)
has a larger value when the covariance of the moments is estimated does not have a clear
explanation since there is no reason to expect that (Z
0

Z)
 1
should be larger than (Z
0
Z)
 1
.
On the other hand, Altonji and Segal (1994) show that although the choice of the weighting
matrix as the variance of the moments gives an eÆcient GMM estimator asymptotically, it leads
to an estimator which has poor small sample properties. Using Monte Carlo experiments they
nd that the estimator is biased because sampling errors in the moments to be estimated are
correlated with sampling errors in the weighting matrix (which is a function of the covariance
of these moments). This may explain why the coeÆcients found and the value of the objective
function are very dierent. Given that the sample is not particularly large the results without
the estimation of the weighting matrix, which still provide consistent estimates, may be favored.
Another issue that has to be stressed is the presence of classication errors in the reported
occupation ranks from year to year. Assuming that these errors are serially uncorrelated,
I reestimated the model with comparative advantage using the second lags of the variables.
Results, reported in second part of Table VI are slightly dierent from those of Table III. All
the coeÆcients have larger standard errors and the b
j
coeÆcients lose their expected increasing
order by rank. This suggests that classication errors might be important.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have analyzed the relative importance of dierent factors explaining the dy-
namics of wages and the workers mobility within rms. To do this, I implemented empirically
the theoretical model proposed by Gibbons and Waldman (1999) which combines the notions
of human capital accumulation, job level assignments based on comparative advantage and
learning about the worker's ability to characterize the wage policy of rms.
Using survey data for a large sample of workers I can draw conclusions on the common
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features arising from the wage policy of rms for a large sample of rms. The longitudinal
dimension of the data allows me to analyze the wage and mobility dynamics. Based on the
German GSOEP over the years 1986 to 1996, the results can be summarized in the following
points.
The main common features characterizing the wage policy of German rms are the impor-
tance of non random selection of workers into job ranks and the evidence of heterogeneity in
human capital accumulation leading to serial correlation in wage increases. Whether the source
of heterogeneity is individual specic or related to the quality of the worker-rm match seems
to depend on the job rank considered. The unmeasured ability term at the executive rank has
a larger eect on the wage dynamics when it is estimated over the sample of workers moving
inside the rm as well as changing rms. The eects at the lower, middle and upper ranks of
the worker's occupation are similar whether or not rm changers are included in the sample.
The results of this paper reveal the importance of the question of the assignment of workers
to job ranks on our understanding of wage dynamics within as well as between rms. The
evidence on the presence of non-random selection of workers onto the rungs of the job ladder
brings an helps explain the fact that the distribution of wages diers from the distribution
of individual productivities at the level of the rm. These results show that wage dynamics
within the rm depend not only on the worker's ability (innate ability or quality of the match
worker-rm) but also on how productive this ability (or match) is within a specic job rank. In
addition, the fact that the rank premia remain signicant even after controlling for measured
and unmeasured heterogeneity in the wage dynamics suggests that the rm's administrative
rules constitute another relevant explanatory factor.
The estimation of the model of Gibbons and Waldman lead to a relatively good description
of the German case and it would obviously be interesting to compare them with U.S. data.
To my knowledge, there is no American survey data with a question on the job rank of the
worker. However, it would be possible to construct variables on job levels by using the three-
digit codes from the U.S. Census which provide a detailed classication of occupations. Future
research should investigate this issue because if the model of Gibbons and Waldman provides a
reasonable explanation of wage dynamics in German rms it may be even more relevant in U.S.
rms (where the mobility of workers, on which the model is based, is higher than in Germany).
The model of Gibbons and Waldman is based on the assumption that all rms are identical
and therefore have the same hierarchical structure and the same production technology. Further
research could investigate the possibility that rms of dierent size dier in their internal
organization as suggested by the empirical evidence on the impact of rm size on wage outcomes
(see for example Brown and Medo (1989)). This could imply that the productivity of a given
worker-job-level match is dierent in large and small rms.
Finally, one thing that is absent in the model of Gibbons and Waldman is the role of
incentives in the determination of the wage policy of rms. Lazear (2001) analyzes the question
of explaining the observed decline in the worker's productivity after a promotion. Using the
Gibbons and Waldman theoretical framework, he explains the rm's strategic decision of who
and when to promote workers in order to minimize the post promotion productivity decline.
Given that the Gibbons andWaldman model is easily implementable empirically, future research
should investigate the possible empirical applications of the augmented model that considers
the role of incentives.
17
1. Rosenbaum (1984), Spilerman and Petersen (1993), Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994
a,b), Podolny and Baron (1995) and Chiappori and al. (1996).
2. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b)
3. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom(1994 a,b) in the case of one rm and Card and Hyslop
(1995) nd identical conclusions using the CPS and PSID. A related nding is found in Peltzman
(2000). Using data from the BLS, it is found that output prices increase more than they decrease
in response to shocks in the cost of inputs. Increases in rm's labor costs would therefore induce
real wage decreases.
4. Hause (1980), Lillard and Weiss (1979) and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b).
5. Murphy (1985) Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b) and McCue (1996).
6. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b). McCue (1996) nds that a high wage today is
positively correlated to promotion tomorrow, and, in the same spirit, Topel and Ward (1992)
nd that prior wage growth aects mobility even after controlling for the current wage.
7. Since in Germany, the minimum wage varies by industry, this bound should give a
reasonable minimum in order to exclude outliers for wages without loosing observations on low
wage workers such as trainees.
8. Appendix 2 presents the frequencies of the dierent types of mobility.
9. The lag corresponds to the year before mobility within the rm.
10. I used the International Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC).
11. Given that the dependent variable has few responses (y = 1) compared to non re-
sponses, using a probit model might produce dierent results. I reestimated the model with
the normal distribution. Results (available on request) are similar in which they lead to the
same conclusions in terms of marginal eect coeÆcient and signicance of the coeÆcients.
12. Individuals reporting trainees who were also reported in one of the other occupations
have been retained.
13. This index, reported in the last column of Appendix 3, corresponds to the predicted
wage conditional on measured individual characteristics.
14. However, serial correlation in promotion rates is not a clear prediction of the model
with learning. No matter how informative a worker's history of past output is, an extreme
value of the next period output can radically change the beliefs for that period. See Gibbons
and Waldman for a discussion on this point.
15. A proof of the necessity of this constraint is given in Lemieux (1998).
16. Assuming f(x
it
) = e

0
+
1
x
it
 
2
x
2
it
then g(x
it
) = e

1
+
2
 2
2
x
it
.
17. With an estimated b
1
signicant, the ratio will vary with experience which implies that
accumulation of human capital would not only vary across workers but also over time.
18. The statistic of the test uses the optimized value of the objective function times the
number of observations. The distribution is 
2
(l  p) where p is the number of parameters and
l is the number of instruments.
19. Because learning does not seem to be supported by the data, the analysis thereafter
focuses on the specication with comparative advantage only.
20. Results with learning, available on request, did not lead to a signicant estimation of
the coeÆcients b
0
and b
1
.
21. According to the human capital theory, one additional year of experience should have
a decreasing impact with increasing years of experience with the rm.
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TABLE I
Logit Estimation of Intrafirm Mobility
a
Model
b
Baseline Marg. Lagged Lagged All Marg.
Specication Eect Bonus Wage Gr. Variables Eect
High Sc. 0.293 0.011 0.249 0.048 0.052 0.001
(0.181) (0.189) ( 0.337) (0.336)
College 0.566*** 0.022 0.557** 0.508 0.505 0.010
(0.216) (0.225) (0.387) (0.236)
Tenure -0.086*** -0.002 -.0008 -0.098** -0.100** -0.001
(0.022 ) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041)
German 0.138 0.005 0.262 0.112 0.106 0.002
(0.227 ) (0.229) (0.431) (0.432)
Female -0.181 -0.007 -0.275*** -0.088 -0.088 -0.002
(0.119 ) (0.126) (0.203) (0.203)
Married -0.334*** -0.013 -0.299*** -0.316* -0.315* -0.006
(0.112 ) ( 0.116) (0.192) (0.192)
Size 0.634*** 0.025 0.733*** 0.531*** 0.526*** 0.010
(0.112 ) (0.121 ) (0.180) (0.180)
Contract -0.149 -0.006 0.214 -0.322 -0.335 -0.006
(0.221 ) (0.241) (0.389) (0.388)
Public 0.188 0.007 0.225 0.268 0.257 0.005
(0.174 ) (.180) (0.267) (0.270)
Lbonus - - -1.888*** - 0.329 0.006
(0.144) (0.441)
LwageGr - - - 2.280*** 2.293*** 0.041
(0.744) (0.744)
a-The number of observations for y = 1 is 638 over a total of 14493.
b-All specications include dummies for industry, occupations and a quadratic function
of tenure and a cubic function of the wage growth rate.
***= signicant at 1 %. **= signicant at 5 %.*= signicant at 10 %.
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TABLE II
Wage Differentials by Job Rank
Models
a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
b
OLS OLS FE OLS with CA
Skill - 1.589*** 1.653*** -
(0.034) (0.092)
Rank L - - -
Rank M 0.357*** 0.121*** 0.021* 0.20***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020)
Rank U 1.373*** 0.684*** 0.157*** 0.70***
(0.039) (0.035) (0.019) (0.039)
Rank X 2.195*** 1.204*** 0.219*** 0.92***
(0.077) (0.068) (0.032) (0.119)
Skill*Rank L - - - 1.21***
(0.041)
Skill*Rank M - - - 1.53***
(0.065)
Skill*Rank U - - - 1.99***
(0.082)
Skill*Rank X - - - 2.37***
(0.180)
Adj. R2 0.48 0.62 0.11 0.63
Observations 11159 11159 11159 11159
Test of Equality of slopes 103.43
p-value of the 
2
-test .000
a-Dependent variable is wage in level in thousand of marks. Standard errors have been
computed using the White correction.
b-Are also included are dummies for the type of contract, large rm size, public sector,
occupations, industries and years.
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TABLE III: Wage Dynamics Within Firms
a
Comparative Advantage
Specication
b
1 Low Middle Upper Executive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank E
Ranks d
L
d
M
d
U
d
E
- 0.051 0.095* 0.195***
(0.035) (0.053) (0.062)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured c
L
c
M
c
U
c
E
1 1.043*** 1.475*** 1.600***
(0.081) (0.149) (0.277)
Measured 
L

M

U

E
0.735*** 0.728*** 0.411*** 0.032
(0.121) (0.139) (0.157) (0.349)
Ratio b
0
b
0
1.023***
(0.006)
Tests
c
for Equality Joint M=L U=L E=L
of Slopes c
j
15.00 (0.00) 0.28 (0.59) 10.10 (0.00) 4.69 (0.03)
of Slopes 
j
6.12 (0.10) 0.01 (0.92) 3.70 (0.05) 4.04 (0.04)
of Ratio b
0
= 1 16.27 (0.00)
Overidentication Test
c
17.10 (0.99)
Comparative Advantage and Learning
Specication
b
2 Low Middle Upper Executive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank E
Ranks d
L
d
M
d
U
d
E
- 0.104** 0.006 0.036
(0.038) (0.047) (0.092)
Skill*Ranks
Unobserved c
L
c
M
c
U
c
E
1 1.204*** 1.021*** 0.967***
(0.133) (0.127) (0.182)
Measured 
L

M

U

E
0.473** 0.364** 0.609*** 0.492*
(0.192) (0.150) (0.133) (0.262)
Ratio b
0
b
0
1.008***
(0.006)
Tests
c
for Equality Joint M=L U=L E=L
of Slopes c
j
9.47 (0.03) 2.33 (0.13) 0.03 (0.86) 0.03 (0.86)
of Slopes 
j
3.83 (0.28) 0.63 (0.43) 0.53 (0.47) 0.00 (0.95)
of Ratio b
0
= 1 2.00 (0.15)
Overidentication Test
c
13.11 (0.99)
a-Dependent variable is wage in level in thousand of marks. Also included are dummies for the
type of contract, large rm size, public sector, occupations, industries and years.
b-Estimation using 
 = I. Number of observations is 11159 in the comparative advantage case
and 9891 in the learning case.
c-
2
-test with p-value in parenthesis.
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TABLE IV: Wage Dynamics Within and Between Firms
a
Comparative Advantage
Specication
b
1 Low Middle Upper Executive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank E
Ranks d
L
d
M
d
U
d
E
- 0.058* 0.118** 0.181*
(0.032) (0.051) (0.076)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured c
L
c
M
c
U
c
E
1 1.079*** 1.486*** 2.019***
(0.080) (0.177) (0.362)
Measured 
L

M

U

E
0.989*** 0.986*** 0.746*** 0.019
(0.121) (0.134) (0.138) (0.377)
Ratio b
0
b
0
1.024***
(0.006)
Tests
c
for Equality Joint M=L U=L E=L
of Slopes c
j
14.72 (0.00) 0.97 (0.32) 7.58 (0.00) 7.94 (0.00)
of Slopes 
j
7.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.95) 2.28 (0.13) 6.64 (0.01)
of Ratio b
0
= 1 13.80 (0.00)
Overidentication Test
c
21.48 (0.88)
Comparative Advantage and Learning
Specication
b
2 Low Middle Upper Executive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank E
Ranks d
L
d
M
d
U
d
E
- 0.077* 0.004 -0.018
(0.044) (0.047) (0.115)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured c
L
c
M
c
U
c
E
1 1.078*** 0.897*** 1.032***
(0.126) (0.118) (0.213)
Measured 
L

M

U

E
0.634*** 0.672*** 0.807*** 0.363
(0.183) (0.144) (0.124) (0.294)
Ratio b
0
b
0
1.009***
(0.006)
Tests
c
for Equality Joint M=L U=L E=L
of Slopes c
j
9.72 (0.02) 0.38 (0.54) 0.76 (0.39) 0.02 (0.88)
of Slopes 
j
3.89 (0.27) 0.11 (0.74) 1.03 (0.31) 0.71 (0.40)
of Ratio b
0
= 1 2.08 (0.15)
Overidentication Test
c
14.47 (0.99)
a-Dependent variable is wage in level in thousand of marks. Also included are dummies for the
type of contract, large rm size, public sector, occupations, industries and years.
b-Estimation using 
 = I. Number of observations is 11929 in the comparative advantage case
and 10439 when learning is considered.
c-
2
-test with p-value in parenthesis.
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TABLE V: Wage Dynamics and Human Capital Accumulation Ratio
a
Within Firms
Estimation
b
1 Low Middle Upper Executive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank E
Ranks d
L
d
M
d
U
d
E
- 0.098* 0.129*** 0.223***
(0.040) (0.046) (0.054)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured c
L
c
M
c
U
c
E
1 1.166*** 1.393*** 1.459***
(0.097) (0.128) (0.246)
Measured 
L

M

U

E
0.697*** 0.587*** 0.499*** 0.217
(0.113) (0.149) (0.149) (0.313)
Tenure Ratio b
0
b
1
b
0
e
b
1
x
it
1 0.001***
(0.0004)
Tests
c
for Equality Joint M=L U=L E=L
of Slopes c
j
18.67 (0.00) 2.85 (0.09) 9.44 (0.00) 3.48 (0.06)
of Slopes 
j
5.48 (0.14) 1.27 (0.26) 1.72 (0.19) 2.36 (0.12)
Overidentication Test
c
19.39 (0.95)
Within and Between Firms
Estimation
b
2 Low Middle Upper Executive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank E
Ranks d
L
d
M
d
U
d
E
- 0.104*** 0.156*** 0.214*
(0.037) (0.042) (0.065)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured c
L
c
M
c
U
c
E
1 1.202*** 1.353*** 1.766***
(0.095) (0.145) (0.310)
Measured 
L

M

U

E
0.903*** 0.842*** 0.829*** 0.249
(0.112) (0.141) (0.129) (0.334)
Tenure Ratio b
0
b
1
b
0
e
b
1
x
it
1 0.001***
(0.0005)
Tests
c
for Equality Joint M=L U=L E=L
of Slopes c
j
16.28 (0.00) 4.54 (0.03) 5.95 (0.01) 6.10 (0.01)
of Slopes 
j
5.04 (0.17) 0.84 (0.35) 0.27 (0.60) 3.86 (0.05)
Overidentication Test
c
21.85 (0.88)
a-Dependent variable is wage in level in thousand of marks. Also included are dummies for the
type of contract, large rm size, public sector, occupations, industries and years. Both estimat-
-ions are performed for comparative advantage case.
b-Estimation using 
 = I. Number of observations is 11159 for the sample of moves within
rms and 11927 when moves between rms are included.
c-
2
-test with p-value in parenthesis.
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TABLE VI: Wage Dynamics Estimation
a
Estimation with Non Homoscedastic Errors
Estimation
b
1 Low Middle Upper Executive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank E
Ranks d
L
d
M
d
U
d
E
- 0.108* 0.088 0.155*
(0.061) (0.089) (0.087)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured c
L
c
M
c
U
c
E
1 1.212*** 1.583*** 1.285***
(0.159) (0.214) (0.349)
Measured 
L

M

U

E
1.134*** 1.088*** 0.965*** 1.098
(0.168) (0.205) (0.270) (0.320)
Ratio b
0
b
0
1.003***
(0.008)
Tests
c
for Equality Joint M=L U=L E=L
of Slopes c
j
8.71 (0.03) 1.78 (0.18) 7.39 (0.00) 0.67 (0.41)
of Slopes 
j
1.27 (0.73) 0.43 (0.51) 0.81 (0.39) 0.02 (0.89)
of Ratio b
0
= 1 0.13 (0.72)
Overidentication Test
c
58.99 (0.00)
Estimation with Second Quasi-Differencing
Estimation
d
2 Low Middle Upper Executive
Ranks d
L
d
M
d
U
d
E
- 0.019 0.135** 0.187
(0.076) (0.068) (0.117)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured c
L
c
M
c
U
c
E
1 0.874*** 0.826*** 1.129***
(0.199) (0.219) (0.275)
Measured 
L

M

U

E
1.192*** 1.268*** 1.283*** 0.987
(0.261) (0.158) (0.167) (0.336)
Ratio b
0
b
0
1.029***
(0.012)
Tests
c
for Equality Joint M=L U=L E=L
of Slopes c
j
16.27 (0.00) 0.40 (0.53) 0.62 (0.43) 0.22 (0.64)
of Slopes 
j
1.78 (0.62) 0.16 (0.68) 0.15 (0.70) 0.35 (0.55)
of Ratio b
0
= 1 5.42 (0.02)
Overidentication Test
c
31.76 (0.80)
a-Dependent variable is wage in level in thousand of marks. Also included are dummies for the
type of contract, large rm size, public sector, occupations, industries and years. Both estimat-
-ions are performed for the comparative advantage case.
b-Estimation of 
 using the residuals from NLIV with 
 = I in a rst step.
c-
2
-test with p-value in parenthesis.
d-Estimation using variables in t and t  2 in the wage equation. Number of observations is 7775.
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Appendix 1: Data Selection
First selection:
First selection on age and employement status (full-time, regular part-time or training within
the rm). The sas dataset has 61787 observations.
Sample selection for the frequency computations:
Constructions of dummies for individual characteristics, industries and mobility (from the in-
formation on changes in employment situation). Selection of monthly nominal wages over 500
marks and computation of wage growth. Exclusion of self-employed workers and computation
of weights as relative to the mean weight. The resulting dataset has 41793 observations. Final
corrections of intersections between industries and occupations gives the dataset used for the
frequency analysis with 32493 observations. Selection for logit and wage estimations (OLS and
GMM):
Supplementary exclusion because of problems in the construction of dummies for ranks within
occupations (trainee is considered as a position with two levels trainee or student trainee but
these two levels are not comparable with the ranks of white-collared or of other type of posi-
tions). They have thus been excluded. Moreover, one of the levels for white-collar workers is
non tenured foreman which is diÆcult to associate with one of the 4 ranks considered. They
have thus been excluded. The use of lags in estimations reduced the number of observations
to 11929. Further selection of workers who remain within their rm (without change or with
intrarm mobility) lead to the use of 11159 observations for the logit model and the OLS and
GMM estimations.
Sample Statisctics (Weighted) GSOEP- All Workers
Real monthly Wage (DM 1985) after Tax 2280.9
Years in School 11.5
Age 36.2
Percentage Female 42.3
Percentage German 90.9
Percentage Blue-Collars 40.2
Percentage White-Collars 47.5
Percentage Civil Servant 9.8
Percentage Trainees 2.5
Number of Observations 32492
Number of Individuals 6171
Sample Statisctics (Weighted) GSOEP- Workers Within Firm
Real monthly Wage (DM 1985) after Tax 2177.72
Years in School 11.1
Age 41.7
Percentage Female 38.5
Percentage German 70.3
Percentage Blue-Collars 53.4
Percentage White-Collars 38.4
Percentage Civil Servant 8.2
Number of Observations 11159
Number of Workers 3487
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Appendix 2: Frequency of Mobility and Wage Growth
The possible answers to the question on the changes in employment situation since the
preceding year are as follows:
1. no change
2. have a job with a new employer
3. became self-employed
4. have changed position within the rm
5. took up a job for the rst time in my life
6. gone back to work after a break
I have categorized the dierent changes in employment situation into four groups:\No
changes" \Separations",\Intrarm Mobility" and \Other". Answers 2 and 3 are considered
as separations, 4 as intrarm mobility and 6 as other types of moves. I considered workers
in the rm for at least one period so observations on answer 5 have been excluded from the
sample. Frequencies conditional on potential experience and gender are presented in the Ap-
pendix 2.1 Table below. 89% of the workers surveyed experience no changes in employment
situation. Among the 11% who are mobile, one half experienced separations while intrarm
mobility accounts for one fourth of the moves. Note also that all types of mobility declines with
experience. The percentage of separations is high during the rst ten years of experience but
decreases rapidly after. Intrarm mobility declines less rapidly than separations. Note that
men experience fewer changes in employment situation than women.
Mean wage growth associated with the four categories of changes is provided in the Appendix
2.2. Based on the dierence in the log of current and lagged real wages after deductions for
tax and social security (compared to gross earnings, net earnings have been reported more
frequently). The Table shows that the mean wage growth resulting from intrarm mobility is
relatively important and quite close to the wage growth workers experience after separations.
Since separations are dened to include only moves to a new employer or to self-employment,
one might suspect that most of those separations are voluntary and therefore associated with
important wage growth.
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Appendix 2.1: Frequency of Mobility by Experience (GSOEP)
Experience No Separation Intrarm Other N
Change Mobility
Men
0-10 70.6 17.6 5.7 6.2 2869
11-20 87.6 7.4 3.6 1.5 5368
21-30 94.3 2.6 2.2 0.9 5483
31- 96.7 1.8 1.3 0.7 7010
Total 90.1 5.5 2.7 1.7 20730
Women
0-10 73.2 15.9 5.8 5.1 2468
11-20 84.2 6.5 3.2 6.0 2983
21-30 89.4 4.8 1.9 3.9 2955
31- 95.5 1.2 1.3 0.4 3356
Total 86.4 6.7 2.8 4.1 11762
Total 88.8 5.9 2.7 2.5 32492
Appendix 2.2: Wage Growth Associated with Mobility (GSOEP)
Experience No Separation Internal Other N
Change Mobility
Men
0-10 .049 (.005) .113 (.02) .102 (.02) .073 (.04) .063 (.005)
11-20 .029 (.002) .072 (.01) .080 (.01) .031 (.14) .033 (.002)
21-30 .016 (.002) .059 (.03) .033 (.01) .056 (.04) .017 (.002)
31- .009 (.002) .010 (.04) .045 (.01) -.213 (.14) .010 (.002)
Total .020 (.001) .082 (.01) .071 (.008) .024 (.04) .025 (.001)
Women
0-10 .039 (.004) .125 (.02) .158 (.03) .036 (.09) .060 (.005)
11-20 .026 (.003) .111 (.03) .078 (.02) .065 (.05) .034 (.004)
21-30 .022 (.003) .048 (.02) .042 (.02) .061 (.08) .024 (.003)
31- .014 (.003) .144 (.05) .029 (.01) .149 (.04) .016 (.003)
Total .023 (.002) .107 (.01) .099 (.01) .077 (.03) .030 (.001)
Total .021 (.001) .092 (.008) .081 (.007) .048 (.03) .027 (.001)
29
Appendix 3: Average Characteristics by Rank
a
Position Wage Edu. Exp. Woman German Married Skill
Di
b
(Yr) (Yr) (%) (%) (%) Index
Blue-C
Unskilled 0 9.4 27.8 63.3 64.5 63.7 -0.29
Semi-skilled 0.37 9.8 26.8 41.1 79.2 60.8 -0.14
Skilled 0.66 10.6 22.4 9.5 89.2 49.5 0.01
Foreman 1.05 10.4 26.6 3.1 92.8 80.5 0.09
Master Crafts. 1.11 10.9 25.9 1.42 98.4 61.3 0.11
White-C
Simple duties 0 10.9 22.2 81.8 94.6 48.4 -0.30
Qualied 0.64 11.8 21.7 62.7 96.5 50.7 -0.12
Managerial 2.09 14.3 21.9 25.1 96.2 65.5 0.31
C.E.O 2.85 13.8 27.0 0.59 98.2 48.9 0.34
Civil Servant
Lower 0 10.7 25.4 14.4 100 64.5 0.01
Middle 0.50 11.5 21.5 23.1 100 58.2 0.07
Upper 1.23 14.9 22.3 36.7 99.6 64.2 0.30
Executive 2.24 17.7 24.6 14.8 99.8 77.5 0.65
Aggregate
c
Rank 1 0 10.1 25.5 58.9 82.7 56.9 -0.21
Rank 2 0.49 11.3 21.9 39.0 94.0 50.8 -0.05
Rank 3 1.67 13.9 22.7 25.1 96.6 67.1 0.28
Rank 4 2.46 16.1 25.3 14.4 99.1 66.2 0.52
a-Mean wage dierentials relative to the rst rank. The monthly average real
wage (in thousand of marks) is 1.37 for blue-collars, 1.41 for white-collared, 1.93
for civil servants and 1.58 for level 1 of the aggregate positions. For blue-collars,
rank 1 includes unskilled and semi-skilled work.
b-Based on a sample of 32492 observations (6171workers).
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